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Two Decades of Gramscian Scholarship in
China: A Critical Retrospection
Yue Zhou Lin
I. Introduction
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) has been widely acknowledged as
a renowned Italian Marxist and socialist for his political leadership
in the anti-fascist movement against Mussolini’s totalitarian regime
in the inter-war years. However, Gramsci’s legacy has been widely
recognized beyond Europe. Even though the politics of his life
have faded from living memory, his thought has increased in
influence among a multitude of disciplines in the academic
firmament.
In recent years, the Marxist academic circle in China has felt a
Gramsci vibe. This is hardly surprising because a wide range of
schools of thought has been (mis)appropriated in China by
intellectuals and the Communist Party of China (CPC) since the
reform and opening-up in 1978. Although the CPC has enforced
tough measures to censor outspoken and critical intellectuals, there
is a narrow gateway left for Marxist academics and party officials to
study the works of Trotsky and Gramsci. No doubt, such an
endeavour involves using Trotsky and Gramsci to formulate and
consolidate the official narrative that secures the CPC leadership.
Yet, it is still crucial to examine how Gramsci’s thought has been
perceived and adopted by Chinese scholars in and out of China beyond the European context. This is a project to which Gramsci himself would hold dearly given his linguistic background. Gramsci was
a scholar with profound intercultural and multilingual awareness.
He refused to glorify cultural-linguistic identities as exclusive, selfsufficient entities. Instead, he advocated what we now call bilingualism or multilingualism and saw foreign language acquisition and
translation as ways to overcome linguistic barriers (Carlucci 2013).1
1 In a letter to his wife, Julia (also Julija or Jul’ka) Schucht of 5 September 1932, Gramsci
specified that a translator should be able to acquaint one language with the other ‘by using the
historically determined language of the civilization to which he supplies the informative
material […] this kind of work deserves to be done, indeed deserves committing all one’s efforts
to it’ (Gramsci 1994a, p. 207).
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Therefore, one would expect that the issue of lost-in-translation
creeps in when studying Gramsci across two continents, Europe
and China. Nevertheless, there are three general challenges faced by
all Gramsci scholars. First, Gramsci’s most well-known thirty-three
Prison Notebooks (hereafter Notebooks) cover topics beyond the
confines of any single discipline, so misinterpretation arises when
one knows little about specific topics (Morera, 1990, pp. 3-4).
Scholars must be erudite and specialized in knowledge. Second, in
Gramsci’s own words, the notebooks were cryptic – ‘quick prompts
pro memoria...’ to be ‘revised and checked’ and any ‘...imprecisions,
false connexions, anachronisms’ to be ‘radically corrected’ (Gramsci,
1975, p. 1365). Third, scholars across a broad spectrum (see Fontana, 1993, pp. 2-3) have selectively appropriated Gramsci’s texts
(Thomas, 2009, pp. 139-40) for all kinds of reasons.
Having all the above in mind, the article seeks to trace the twodecade-long reception of Gramsci in China by focusing on the
progress and challenges associated with Gramscian scholarship. In
so doing, the article calls for more scholarly attention to Gramsci’s
concept of intellectuals and the integral State in China. The article
also hopes to generate – among western audiences – interest in
Gramscian scholarship in China, refresh a cross-continental
discussion among European and Chinese scholars studying
Gramsci, and offer a cautionary note to the latter.
By structure, the article begins by identifying the three major
shifts witnessed in scholarly engagement with Gramsci’s thought in
China: (1) a shift from labelling Gramsci a Western Marxist, (2) a
shift of focus from the philosophy of praxis to the concept of
hegemony, and (3) a shift toward applying Gramsci in the study of
socio-political problems in China. The article will then review some
Gramscian studies on China conducted by Chinese scholars in and
beyond China and by some western scholars who also use Gramsci
to study China. This hopefully will paint a general landscape of the
progress made in China. Following this, the last section will lodge a
critique of the current stage of Gramscian scholarship in China,
pointing out the (mis)conceptual issues and the overlooked aspects.
The article concludes with suggestions for possible new departures
that would advance Gramscian scholarship in China.

297

International Gramsci Journal No. 16 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2022

II. Three Major Shifts of Gramscian Scholarship in China
From the very beginning, Gramsci’s reception in China was not
freed from Chinese domestic politics. After the birth of the
People’s Republic in 1949, Gramsci did not attract political or
academic interest (Lobina 2009, p. 323) even though he was known
by the higher ranks of the CPC. Chinese then knew from Gramsci
through the Russian edition of his Italian work (Liu 2011, p. 70).
During the Hundred Flowers campaign initiated by Mao Zedong
(Mao hereafter), intellectuals picked up Gramsci momentarily but
their attitudes toward him became negative as the CPC and the
Communist Party of Italy (PCI) diverged on the issue of plural
national roads to socialism (Samarani 2018). The relationship
became even sourer after the Sino-Soviet split (Peters 2012, pp.
106-7), which blocked the Chinese reception of Gramscian literature in Russian. Once Mao’s cultural revolution (1966-76) broke
out, Gramsci was ditched alongside all forms of ‘foreign thought’
(Harris 2015, pp. 69-83; Liu 2011, p. 70).
The freeze finally melted after the PCI leader Berlinguer visited
China in 1980. The CPC and the PCI officially re-established their
relationship, which inaugurated the second phase of Gramsci’s
Chinese reception (Lobina 2009, p. 325), though the encounter
remained limited. Xu Chongwen was the first to introduce Gramsci
to Chinese Marxists then. But Xu refers to Anderson (1976b) who
focuses on Western Marxism and consequently many Chinese
Marxists of Xu’s time label Gramsci as a Western Marxist (Liu
2011, pp. 71-2). They argue that Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis
was a deviation from Marx and Engels’ materialism.
Nevertheless, there have been three major shifts in Gramscian
scholarship. The first one is a shift from labelling Gramsci as a
‘Western Marxist’ to celebrating him as a great revolutionary of the
proletariat and a distinguished Marxist theorist. The second is a
shift from introducing the philosophy of praxis to studying the
theory of hegemony. The last one is a shift toward applying
Gramsci to addressing social problems in China. Let us trawl
through each shift.
A. Gramsci is a Marxist-Leninist, not a Western Marxist!
The first and probably the most important shift started in the
latter half of the 1980s when the study of Western Marxism
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deepened. Subsequently, Xu’s interpretation of Gramsci went out
of favour. Many Chinese scholars began to view Gramsci’s
philosophy of praxis as another basis for Marxist theories. During
the reform of the curriculum on Marx, many scholars debated
practical materialism and dialectical materialism, dedicating
attention to identifying the works of Gramsci and György Lukács
as theoretical resources for practical materialism.
During this time, although many identified Gramsci as Marxist,
they differed in their reading of Gramsci. Tian for example
advocated a complete cut-off between Gramsci and Western
Marxism and raised Gramsci to a status on par with Lenin and
Leninism (Tian 1984). The process of resuscitating Gramsci also
involved finding connections between Gramsci’s political theory
and those of Chinese revolutionaries. Tian personally supported
this process of philological maturity as the editor of the first
Chinese edition of Gramsci’s prison letters published in 2007. Yang
Haifeng was among the staunchest follower of Tian. Both have
contributed significantly to changing the overall attitude of Chinese
mainstream scholars toward Gramsci (Liu 2011, pp. 76-7). In short,
Gramsci drew upon but developed Lenin’s theory on ideology to
encompass the political-cultural dimension. Gramsci also paid
special attention to the capacity of the masses for self-education.
In this sense, Gramsci and Mao could communicate with each
other. According to Pan Xihua from the China Academy of Social
Science (CASS) in 2009, both Gramsci and Mao accentuated vanguardism and supported mass-line politics, making self-consciousness and education an essential part of party building, although Mao
provided a richer and more concrete analysis (Pan 2009). Before
Pan of course, there were already comparative studies of Gramsci
and Mao in the west (e.g., Todd 1974: Dirlik 1983; Liu 1997).
B. From the philosophy of praxis to the concept of hegemony
The second shift began in the 2000s when Gramscian scholarship changed its focus from introducing the philosophy of praxis to
studying the theory of hegemony. In 2001, Tian published an
article, A brief discussion of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, in which he
took the problems of the State as a point of entry and argued that
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is a key contribution to Marxist
political theory (Tian 2001). The concept of hegemony guides
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political work in both the West and the East (including China).
Liang Shufa of the Renmin (People’s) University of China argues
that scholars must incorporate concepts of hegemony and war of
position when studying the philosophy of praxis (Liang 2004). In
line with Liang, Hu Ailing from Zhengzhou University provides a
comprehensive study of Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis in her
work published in 2009, Ideology, hegemony, and intellectuals: A study of
the philosophy of praxis of Gramsci. Hu’s monumental work is a critique
of vulgar Marxism, idealism, spontaneity, etc., through which it
analyses the relationship between hegemony and ideology, the
concept of civil society, and the salient features of Italian society
and presents a theoretical exposition that identifies the theorypractice totality in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis (Hu 2009). Her
work alongside other similar Gramsci studies has directed scholarly
focus toward Gramsci’s thought, politics, and theory of the party
rather than just the relationship between Gramsci’s philosophy of
praxis and Marxist philosophy.
Perhaps Pan remains the most well-versed in the study of
cultural hegemony and the political system of the proletariat. She
analyses the Chinese explanation of the words ‘egemonia’
(hegemony) and ‘organic intellectual’ and compares Gramsci’s
concept of hegemony and that of other Marxists, especially Lenin’s
concept of political hegemony. Indeed, Pan’s work has allowed
Gramscian scholarship in China to finally catch up with Gramscian
scholarship outside China since the 1970s.
This shift of focus has also driven a paradigm shift from
Marxism to Post-Marxism in China since the 1990s. Yet the
paradigm shift owes a great deal to the scholarly attention to
Althusser’s thought. For example, He Ping at the University of
Wuhan attempts to address the ‘ultimate question’ in Gramsci’s
epistemology and methodology based on Althusser’s critique of
Gramsci, especially historicism. Her endeavour has allowed us to
avoid seeing Gramsci as either an idealist or a materialist (He 2012).
This further allows post-Marxists to respond to their critics and reestablish Gramsci’s cultural philosophy and political philosophy
and a New Gramscianism (not necessarily Robert Cox’s NeoGramscianism, however). In this line, Sun Yixiao has published a
work entitled A Study of Gramsci’s Historicism and Thought, in which
Sun adopts an Althussian-Gramscian lens to study historicism in
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Gramsci’s writings and reflect upon the debate between historicism
and scientism (Sun 2013). On ideology, Wang Fengcai has
published an article entitled Cultural hegemony and Ideological State
Apparatuses: A theoretical analysis of the ideologies of Gramsci and Althusser,
accentuating the connection between Althusser and Gramsci,
despite their differences. Wang argues that Althusser who was
inspired by Gramsci introduced the concept of ‘Ideological State
Apparatuses’. To Wang, Althusser’s distinction between ideological
and repressive state apparatuses resembles Gramsci’s distinction
between civil society and state, or/and between cultural hegemony
and political hegemony. Thus, Althusser’s theory of the ideological
state apparatuses extends Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony
(see Wang 2007).
The post-Marxist turn in China has brought Chinese scholars
closer to their western counterparts when it comes to studying
Gramsci. Among Chinese post-Marxists, there are two prominent
figures. First, Sun Min at Hainan Normal (Teacher’s) University has
published a work, entitled, “Ideological Leadership” in the Viewpoint of
Political Philosophy-From Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe in which he delineates an ever-developing strand of scholarship from Gramsci to
Althusser, and then from Nicos Poulantzas to ‘New Gramscian’
scholars such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe. Sun identifies
the distinctiveness of their understanding of ideology and hegemony
as well as the commonality of their understanding (Sun 2012).
Second, Zhou Fan at Beijing Normal University identifies in his
article, entitled Gramsci and the Formation of “Post-Marxism”, that postMarxism and New Gramscianism are two interrelated theoretical
repertoires (Zhou 2008). In the theoretical realm, there has been a
shift toward political philosophy due to Sun Mingan, who worked
in Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. He has led us to
Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler’s debate with Laclau and Mouffe
about the logic of hegemony and modern Kantianism. Sun argues
that the debate has deepened our research into universality versus
particularity and inevitability versus contingency in traditional
philosophy and accentuated the unbridgeable rift between universality and particularity in modern politics (Sun 2013).
Interestingly, in literary theory which has long been influenced
by currents of structuralism, post-structuralism, orientalism,
feminism, etc., Gramsci’s cultural hegemony has gained a special
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status. Gramscian research in literary theory has overtaken those in
philosophy and Marxism disciplines. One typical example is He
Lei’s Gramsci and Cultural Studies published in 2011.
C. Gramscian analyses of socio-political problems in China
There has been much greater attention to the application of
Gramsci’s thought. Gramscian scholars in China have used
Gramsci to assess China’s socio-political realities. After all, in the
minds of Chinese officials and scholars alike, reading any western
thought should serve the purpose of making the Chinese society
better and its nation stronger. Again, several scholars are worthy of
honourable mention. For instance, Sun Jing compares horizontally
the theory of cultural hegemony and the Frankfurt school and
cultural imperialism, incorporating globalization and antiglobalization theories. Sun is able to animate a discussion around
western cultural hegemony and the practical issues associated with
building ‘cultural’ security in China etc. In other words, Sun is
conscious of the Eurocentric tendency in Gramscian research and
the challenges of boosting confidence about native culture in
China, a once semi-colonized state (Sun 2004).
It is again Pan who has used Gramsci’s concept of cultural
hegemony to study party-building in China at a practical level. She
reveals that the ongoing process of consent formation as Gramsci
advocated is crucial in ensuring that a proletarian party consolidates
its own hegemonic power. This is with what the party’s validity lies
(Pan 2012). In a dynamic balance, an organic party can be
established, which offers insight into the way in which a party
maintains its relationship with the popular masses in an everdigitalized epoch. To some extent, Pan’s work paves the way to
increasing Gramscian research written in Chinese discourse. On the
one hand, this demonstrates originality in Gramscian scholarship
beyond the European confinement, but on the other hand, it could
also demonstrate a considerable degree of Sinicization or localization of Gramsci’s thought. This can be seen in the following
work entitled Struggle for Cultural Hegemony: Gramscian Perspectives of
Revitalizing Chinese Traditional Culture, co-authored by Kang
Xiaoguang, Liu Shilin, and Wang Jin. They have examined the
social practices of the rejuvenation of localized cultures against the
process of socialization and analysed the salient features of
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mainstream culture and the social forces behind such culture. They
have also covered topics such as legitimacy, ideology, cultural
hegemony, and soft power (Kang, Liu, and Wang 2010).
When applying Gramsci to the study of social problems in
China, it is crucial to pay attention to the interplay between agency
and structure. Yang Haifeng, in his book The Philosophy of Praxis and
Hegemony: Gramsci’s Philosophy in Contemporary Discourse, accentuates a
totality of Gramsci’s philosophy, politics, and economics, and
analysed Fordism and its influence on the way Gramsci formulated
its theory of hegemony (Yang 2009).
III. China in a Gramscian Perspective
As the third major shift continues, we have seen a tremendous
advancement in Gramscian studies in general, which is supported
by widely available and more accurate translations of Gramsci’s
works. The translations of the English edition include Cao Leiyu,
Jiang Li, and Zhang Yue’s Chinese edition of the Selections from
Prison Notebooks published in 2000, Selected Works of Gramsci edited
by Li Pengcheng, Theory of the Modern Prince translated by Chen Yue,
Xiang Ming’s translation of Steve Jones’ Antonio Gramsci, etc.
Furthermore, under Tian’s supervision, we have seen translations
of the Prison Notebooks in six volumes over the last three years. Tian
mentioned in 2017 that the first three volumes would be published
in 2019 respectively under the following titles (my translation of the
original Chinese titles): Historical Materialism and Croce’s Philosophy《
历 史 唯 物 主 义 和 克 罗 齐 哲 学 》 , Intellectuals and Cultural
Organizations《知识分子和文化组织》, and Notes on Machiavelli,
Politics, and the Modern State《关于马基雅维利、政治与现代国家
的 笔 记 》 . The next set of three volumes would be published
respectively to celebrate Gramsci’s 130th Anniversary in 2021 with
the following titles (my translation again): Literature and National Life
《文学和民族生活》, The National Rejuvenation Movement《民族复
兴运动》, and Past and Present《过去和现在》. If these volumes
are within the reach of our comrades and Gramscian scholars in
China, we would witness a new wave of more integrative, multidimensional, and sophisticated Gramscian research in China.2 But
2 Currently, these volumes are not found on Google. I suspect that the publication of them
may have been interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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already in 2013, Ye Huizhen formulated a ‘WWWH hegemonic
discourse’ theory and delineated a realistic path by examining how
the CPC shares with the masses its political discourse and
consolidates its cultural hegemony through Who (actors and
audiences), What (subject content), Where (fields), and How
(strategies and tactics) dimensions (Ye and Yang, 2013). She then
incorporated the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas and those of
other post-Marxists and published another work in 2016, entitled,
A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Cultural Hegemony and its
Discourse Paths. This work should offer many insights.
A. General Patterns
A good way to trace the reception of Gramsci and Gramscian
studies in China is to type ‘Gramsci’ (gelanxi, 葛兰西) into the
search engine called China Knowledge Net (zhongguo zhiwang, 中国
知网). By 5 September 2021, there were 2475 published articles
containing the word ‘Gramsci’ from 2000 to 2021 (see Figure 1).
The number of publications was 175 in 2015, a peak in quantity
terms.
But it is also effective to include more Gramsci-related keywords
when tracing Gramscian studies in a broader interdisciplinary
scope. Not all articles necessarily mention Gramsci even though
they use Gramsci’s concepts in their studies.

Number of articles

The trend of published articles containing the word ‘Gramsci’ (2000-2021)

x

Fig. 1 China Knowledge Net

Years (2000-2021)

The data collected on 5 September 2021 show that published
articles from 2000 to 2021 are under a set of themes all related to
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Gramsci, and I rank them by the number of articles (see Table 1).
Indeed, some may contain Gramsci or explore one or more themes,
which may well result in double counting of articles. This
unfortunately remains irresolvable given the availability of data.
Nonetheless, it should not be a major issue because we are more
concerned with the general pattern of Gramscian research in China.
The table result clearly demonstrates the major shifts discussed
in the previous section. There are altogether 293 published articles
that cover cultural hegemony, whereas only 63 published articles
still discuss Western Marxism and only 58 discuss the philosophy
of praxis. In addition, theoretically based articles are significantly
fewer. For example, there are 224 articles for cultural leadership /
hegemony but only 80 for the theory of cultural leadership /
hegemony. Likewise, there are 83 for civil society but only 49 for
the theory of civil society.
Regardless, cultural hegemony is at the core of any Gramscian
discussion in China. Keeping this discussion alive involves not just
Chinese scholars inside China but also those outside China. The
latter have established themselves through publications in English.
Although the former dare not to be openly critical of the CPC, they
are inspired by and learning closely from the latter who are equally
acquiring insiders’ knowledge from the former. This process of
mutual learning is driving forward Gramscian scholarship in and
beyond China.
Number of articles under each theme
Rank

Main
themes
Chinese

2

葛兰西
文化领导权

3
4

市民社会
文化领导权理论

5

文化霸权

6
7

西方马克思主义
领导权

1

in Main themes in English
Gramsci
Cultural
leadership/hegemony
Civil society
Theory
of
Cultural
Leadership/Hegemony
Cultural Hegemony [with
the alternative Chinese
character,
ba
霸
(domination) rather than
lingdao 领导 (leadership)]
Western Marxism
Leadership/Hegemony

Number
published
Articles
452
224

of

83
80
69

63
62
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8
9
10
11
12

实践哲学
市民社会理论
意识形态理论
有机知识分子
霸权理论

13

狱中扎记

14
知识分子
Table 1: China Knowledge Net

The Philosophy of Praxis
Theory of Civil Society
Theory of Ideology
Organic intellectuals
Theory of Hegemony [with
the alternative Chinese
character,
ba
霸
(domination) rather than
lingdao 领导 (leadership)]
Prison Notebooks

58
49
30
28
18

Intellectuals

12

12

B. A Gramscian-China encounter
Whatever perception of the CPC one may hold, it has enjoyed an
almost unwavering political legitimacy in China because it was the
CPC that painstakingly united workers, peasants, and ethnic minorities to resist western imperialism through a down-to-earth myriad
of nationalist and Bolshevik struggles that led to the successful
establishment of the People’s Republic, a class nation, to use Lin
Chun’s terminology (Lin 2015). The CPC has also been a powerful
locomotive behind China’s development of its productive forces
since the reform and opening-up began. Among the left, there is
still ongoing debate around whether the CPC is or has always been
socialist/capitalist or not. But more and more are convinced that
the CPC has exercised and maintained its hegemonic power effectively. The question is around the when and the how. Arguably from
Maoism to Dengism, the CPC has transformed itself from a
totalitarian party-state to a hegemonic party-state (Zhang 2011a,
2011b). Of course, this reading depends on how we reflect upon
what happened at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Mulvad (2019) who provides a bolder interpretation identifies
Maoism, Dengism, and Xiism as three hegemonies. Indeed, despite
millions of death from famine caused by the Great Leap Forward,
and political purges in a series of intra-party power struggles and
nationwide socio-political campaigns leading up to and during the
Cultural Revolution, Mao used charisma and cult around himself to
unite old party veterans (notably Zhou Enlai) and some ‘red
experts’ (scientists), notably Deng Jiaxian, Qian Xuesen (or HsueShen Tsien), and Yang Chen-Ning. The CPC under Mao
industrialized and nuclearized China to keep it alive in the Cold
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War. Under Deng, socioeconomic transformation in China took off
and accelerated, alleviating poverty but widening the gap between
the rich (urban) and the poor (rural). Under Jiang Zemin, the CPC
has expanded its representation by co-opting businesspeople into
its local level branches, arguably changing its composite. Under Hu
Jintao’s slogan of a harmonious society, social reform programmes
were launched to bring the CPC and civil society ever closer. To
rebuild or consolidate the consensus, Xi Jinping has used the China
Dream and the realization of a moderately prosperous society.
Mulvad’s reading is however criticized by Fusaro (2020) who sees
more complex hegemonic transitions, and by ten Brink who
suggests viewing Maoism, Dengism, and Xiism as three different
articulations of the same hegemonic project to avoid discontinuity
between different generations of CPC leaders. Indeed, whether Xi
himself likes this or not, he has stood on the shoulders of his
predecessors who have also stood on Mao’s shoulders. Gow (2017)
for instance argues that ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ has
undergone a shift from the emphasis on the economic base to a
more substantial acknowledgment of cultural power under Xi’s
administration. Gow investigates consensus-building dynamics and
identifies the 12 ‘Core Socialist Values’ as a specific aspect of the
broader China Dream discourse.
By viewing China’s socio-economic development as a form of
the CPC hegemonic transformation in Gramscian terms, we can at
least appreciate that the relationship between the state and society
in China is more intriguing. The concept of the integral State which
Gramsci introduced in Autumn 1930 has become useful in the
Chinese context, especially in overcoming a State against society
dichotomy long echoed in liberal commentators and speculators.
This is not to say that the CPC as a party-State is not oppressive,
but one must not forget that what legitimises its coercive measures
is its close-knitted relationship with civil society in China.
Interestingly, the word ‘civil society’ can cause some discomfort
among those who continue to pay lip service to the CPC
establishment. They argue that Chinese society is not civil in a
‘western’ or ‘liberal’ sense. That said, in a Gramscian context, the
concept of civil society lives on. Recent studies of labour-related
non-governmental organizations (Hui 2020) and Chinese media
(Zhang 2011a, 2011b) have treated the CPC as an integral State that
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rebalances political society and civil society in their integral meaning
or in totality. This rebalancing is best seen in Jiang’s theory of the
‘Three Represents’ that has encompassed private entrepreneurs,
stretching conceptually the Chinese working class and rejecting a
State against business dichotomy (ten Brink 2019, p. 348). But this has
also restructured the class equilibria within the CPC (Gray 2010, p.
457; van der Pijl 2012, p. 509) in contested public-private boundaries. Gow (2017) also adopts a Gramscian integral State conception to argue that civil society is non-neutral and investigates the
reciprocal links between the ‘Core Socialist Values’ created in
China’s political society and spread in the country’s civil society.
Thus, we can also examine hegemony as a ‘chaotic process of
class struggles’ on the terrain of China’s integral State, its historical
conjunctures, and its rural-urban divide. There has been a growing
conflict between internal migrant workers and global capital as the
main struggle in China’s integral State today (Chan and Hui 2017).
What this also implies is the complication of Chinese intellectuals’
identities. There is more here than meets the eye, which continues
to require academic research. For example, some studies have
analysed the interplay between intellectuals and common sense.
The key idea is that Chinese subalterns need their own intellectuals
to transform their implicit knowledge into an explicit philosophy
and culture. Among migrant workers’ unqualified organic, semiorganic, and organic intellectuals. Sum (2017) looks at the
emergence of a ‘loser’ (diaosi, 屌丝) identity among the second
generation of Chinese migrant workers and investigates the
openness of their ‘contradictory consciousness’ and their efforts to
re-hegemonize. Other studies take the wider context of China’s
great 5G race in which new organic intellectuals exert their
influence through social media, either consolidating or disrupting
common sense. They also focus on China Dream which has
become a permanent component of both national and personal
vocabulary and common sense.
All these applications of Gramsci’s concepts continue to offer
us insights into the way the CPC functions as a hegemonic or
integral party-State as well as possible approaches to counter the
CPC hegemony. Unfortunately, due to all kinds of institutional
constraints, Gramscian studies in China focus more on consolidating the leadership and hegemony of the CPC. Other Gramscian
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scholars in China continue to formulate a theoretical understanding
of Gramsci’s other concepts beyond hegemony, evident in Table 1.
IV. Challenges of Gramscian research in China
In the mid-1950s, Tamburrano once lamented that Gramscian
scholars did not study Gramsci’s concept of hegemony sufficiently
(Tamburrano, 1958, p. 277). Gramscian scholars in the West took
two decades (the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s) to place hegemony
at the core of Gramsci’s thought, In China, Gramscian scholars
took about the same time. Interestingly, since the 1980s, there has
been an overemphasis and inevitably overstretching of the concept
of hegemony in the West. The same tendency has been witnessed
in China.
A. Conceptual issues
Gramscian studies in China tend to conflate the concept of hegemony and ‘legitimacy’ or ‘ideological dominance’, or even ‘power or
control’ (Hui, 2016, p. 434-36). Table 1 shows that ‘wenhua
lingdaoquan’ 文化领导权 is supposed to be ‘cultural leadership’ in
English but is also ‘cultural hegemony’. Over 200 published articles
have used leadership and hegemony interchangeably. Moreover,
‘wenhua baquan’ 文化霸权 should be ‘cultural domination’ but 69
articles refer it to ‘cultural hegemony’ as well, conflating domination and hegemony. This is problematic because hegemony contains the dialectical moments of leadership (consent) and domination (coercion). Perhaps a synthesis can be achieved with ‘tongshi’
统识 as an alternative term for hegemony – ‘tong’ means to lead,
manage, and incorporate, and ‘shi’ refers to ‘knowledge, understanding, thought, and consciousness’ (Huang 2015, p. 406).
Strange as it may seem, Huang’s suggestion has not been
accepted in Mainland China. Perhaps, it is hard to convince writers
to change something that is already widely used. But Huang’s
‘tongshi’ also makes domination (coercion) disappear in the
concept of hegemony. The overwhelming translation of cultural
hegemony into cultural leadership in Chinese, rather than cultural
domination may be due to the CPC censor. The authors do not
want to upset the CPC. When cultural domination is used, it may
well refer to US hegemony. The negative representation of the
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‘Other’ and the positive representation of the ‘Self’ are visible,
allowing the double standard to creep in.
Another obvious issue is the overemphasis on the term ‘cultural
hegemony’. Whether theoretically or empirically based, 373 articles
in Table 1 have ‘cultural’ before ‘hegemony’, whereas there are only
80 articles that do not have ‘cultural’. The ratio is 4.66:1. Sadly, this
is a consequence of the post-Marxist turn, which can also be related
to censorship because without ‘culture’, Gramsci’s concept of
hegemony may appear too ‘political’ for the CPC. Yet, ‘cultural
hegemony’ never belongs to Gramsci’s constellation of concepts.
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is as materialistic as ideational. For
example, Hu’s ‘Harmonious Society’ proposal does not emerge
from mid-air. It is a response to phases of intensive capital-labour
struggles. The proposal incorporated two goals of the CPC –
capital accumulation and socio-economic and legal material
concessions (labour law) to the Chinese working class (Hui and
Chan 2011). Under Xi, the ongoing consensus building around the
China Dream worldview has been accompanied by coercive
measures such as crackdowns on corrupt officials and organizations, locally organized crimes, big internet tycoons, and the
entertainment industry. The materiality of hegemony is something
overlooked by Gramscian scholars in China but also by some postMarxist scholars in the West.
Lastly, the overwhelming focus on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has also led to misappropriation of it, cutting it off from its
vital relationships with Gramsci’s other concepts. Gramscian
scholarship in the West has witnessed to some extent a shift toward
Gramsci’s concept of the integral State. Somehow this is not found
in Mainland China. This is a big lacuna! Strangely, Chinese scholars
have studied Gramsci’s concept of (organic) intellectuals but
without emphasizing the integral State concept. I argue that we
must find the interconnection between various State-society
formulations in the Prison Notebooks to avoid misunderstanding
Gramsci. Anderson (1976a) once identified these formulations as
antinomies. However, Francioni (1984), Thomas (2009), and Lin
(2022) have all rejected this reading. Two of the three State-society
formulations, the integral State(-society) and the totalitarian State,
are interrelated dynamically (see Lin 2022, pp. 7-10).
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Again Table 1 shows that Gramsci’s concepts of organic
intellectuals and intellectuals are still underexplored. That said,
there are some theoretical articles out there. For example, Xu and
Zhao distinguish Gramsci’s concept of organic intellectuals by
telling differences between broad and narrow definitions. Broadly,
organic intellectuals are organic as they constantly develop an intraclass cohesion with their own social class. Narrowly, they demonstrate cohesion and integration between intellectuals/theory and
masses/practice (Yu and Zhao 2016, pp. 27-8).
Moreover, according to Wang Weixian and Wang Yaqi (2020), it
is only through a dynamic balancing of the interactions that organic
intellectuals and workers are cultivated. There is neither is there an
exclusive workers’ movement nor an independent intellectuals’
movement. The two Wangs have thus identified two linkages. First,
there is the horizontal linkage between organic intellectuals and
masses. So, workers become educators while intellectuals are
‘massified’. Second, there is the vertical linkage between traditional
and organic intellectuals. Their respective identity can switch.
Traditional intellectuals can become organic if they undertake
ethical-political changes. Organic intellectuals may become ossified
and conservative and lose their ‘organic’ character. They become
increasingly connected and make progress theoretically through
constant debates and history. Interestingly, the Wangs treat organic
intellectuals as civil servants or administrators of the superstructures
and mediators of social life (Wang and Wang 2020, pp. 84-5).
If given the opportunity, I think they would have discussed
whether Gramsci meant ‘individual’ or the ‘collective’ when referring to organic intellectuals. For Kate Crehan, Gramsci focused on
the latter (Crehan 2016, p. 35). In other words, the proletariat
builds its integral momentum by fostering its ‘collective’ intellectuals. They together become the leading class; the bourgeoisie
becomes the ‘new led’ and exists as traditional intellectuals (Lin
2022, p. 14). Mu Meiliang lays out five tasks for proletarian
(organic) intellectuals. First, they should disseminate and politicize
knowledge to raise their ideological consciousness and comrades.
Second, proletarian intellectuals rule and assimilate traditional
intellectuals. Third, they make full use of the ‘argumentative
strength’ of traditional intellectuals. Fourth, proletarian intellectuals
articulate and propagate the new worldview and leaders’ ideology in
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the simplest language. Fifth, they engage constantly in a war of
position (Mu 2020, p. 43-4).
Generally speaking, Gramscian scholars in China need to
develop systematic research on Chinese intellectuals from a
Gramscian perspective. We anticipate more studies to be conducted on the entire Prison Notebooks of Gramsci, which will be of
great importance. Table 1 shows that there are 12 articles written
on this. But this is far from being sufficient in any sense.
B. The voiceless young
It is a blessing that Sum (2017) has studied the identity and reharmonization of the ‘loser’ (diaosi). It is high time for Gramsci to
be used for studying subalterns and the marginalized in China.
Although diaosi can refer to any age, it does trigger the nerves of
young people who are seeking a job and life in desperation. The
idea of ‘a counterattack from the loser’ (diaosi nixi, 屌丝逆袭) was
once all too familiar in China. It is similar to what English people
would relate – a ‘working-class hero’, a vulnerable, materialistically
deprived person who managed to liberate him/herself from his/her
humble beginnings, escape poverty, and achieve success (usually
wealth and power). Is this revolutionary or wishful thinking?
Another similar term is ‘phoenix boy’ (fenghuang nan, 凤凰男)
which describes a thrifty boy from the countryside or urban slums
daring to dream big and go on a date with a ‘peacock girl’ (kongque
nv, 孔雀女) who is stereotypically spoiled and wasteful. All the
melodrama is to say that the marriage between a phoenix boy and a
peacock girl is the ridiculous déjà vu of Titanic!
None of this, unfortunately, has generated a strong sense of
collective solidarity let alone class consciousness. Nevertheless, the
996 work culture (9 a.m. to 9 p.m. 6 days a week) has led to new
waves of young people who are beginning to resist it in their own
way. For example, be passive or not, the outcry of ‘laying down’
(tanping, 躺平) is somewhat a collective response to ever-inhuman
‘internal competition’ (neijuan, 内卷). This has gained traction and
may resonate among young people as often the voiceless.
Gramscian scholars in and beyond China can capitalize on this, and
cultivate young comrades in their pursuit of a sort of ‘layingdownism’ (tanping zhuyi, 躺平主义) from below. One should not
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dismiss it or see it as simply a form of soft resistance to structural
exploitation. On the contrary, it can turn into a Gramscian war of
position that may lead to something more profound when given
sufficient attention. For example, the laydownist mentality comes
from young people’s long-standing anxiety about their ‘sense of
existence’ (chunzai gan, 存在感) and ‘sense of security’ (anquan gan,
安全感). Unlike the previous generation, young workers today no
longer accept self-struggle (ziwo fendou, 自我奋斗) as the golden
rule of life because it is often used to manipulate and brainwash
them into submission. Even traditional values of ‘sense of gain’
(huodegan, 获得感) and ‘sense of achievement’ (chengjiu, 成就感)
have become so superficial or nothing more than whitebait to make
them work until they empty their tanks of labour power. Karoshi or
‘overwork death’ (guolaosi, 过 劳 死 ) and ‘overwork obesity’
(guolaofei, 过劳肥) are widespread phenomena in certain sectors
such as computer programming now. The ever-widening gap
between the rich and the poor cannot simply be resolved by blindly
following the ‘work hard and gain more’ principle that the
neoliberals sell as universal work ethics. Young people have
awakened and begun to resist however desperately structural
inequalities. Gramsci would help young people and the workingclass foster collectively their organic intellectuals as a collective too.
V. Conclusion
The article provides an exploratory analysis of two decades of
Gramscian scholarship in China, identifying both progress and
challenges. It also demonstrates that much work is needed to make
conversations between Gramscian scholars in and beyond China.
We may be easily frustrated by ever-tightening censorship in China
that has placed undeniable constraints on Chinese comrades.
Nevertheless, welcoming signs are seen in the ever-more positive
reception of Gramsci, so are some innovative ideas contextualized
in the current CPC hegemony. We should therefore remain
engaged with Gramscian scholars in China.
The radical left may be concerned about the post-Marxist turn in
China that has misconstrued Gramsci in a new way. But bear in
mind that Chinese post-Marxist scholars have only acquired this
from their colleagues in the west. There is not yet a distinctive and
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independent post-Marxist wave emerging in China. Like all
theoretical thoughts, Gramsci cannot mitigate the fate of being
picked on a supermarket shelf by Chinese scholars who regularly
shop (or appropriate) for convenience. This may sound disturbing
to Gramsci’s loyalists, but it was the wish of Gramsci himself to
have his concepts used and refigured freely according to the local
and national contexts and even to be replaced when reality denies
his thought. As Gramscian scholars, we must keep ourselves at
least as open-minded as Gramsci did. Perhaps, we can demand
some honesty from our Chinese comrades. All we need to do is
kindly ask them to maintain Gramsci as a Marxist-Leninist and
avoid putting words in his mouth when using his concept for a
post-Marxist inquiry.
On this note, the article suggests eight new frontiers to further
advance Gramscian scholarship in and beyond China: (1) see China
as a work-in-progress integral State and the CPC as a hegemony
neither capitalist nor socialist, (2) place the Chinese working class at
the centre in phases of hegemonic processes, (3) bring class
struggle back and think innovatively forms of war of position and
movement in Chinese society, (4) pay attention to processes of
proletarianization in a wide range of sectors that contribute to the
expansion of the working-class population against the burgeoning
middle class, (5) strengthen links between intellectuals and common
sense by pivoting on dominant/subaltern identities and the integral
State(-society), (6) focus on young people’s ‘lying-downism’ as a
protest and link it to the wider opposition to the hegemonic current
within China, (7) re-establish a historical and dialectical materialist
reading of Gramsci without dismissing the role of culture, and (8)
use Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the integral state and
study China to construct a theory of the socialist state-society.
These eight suggestions will also help revitalize Marxism as an
unfinished ‘kaleidoscope’ that involves a ‘long arch of democratic
struggles’ (Thomas 2015, p. 112) rather than a monolith of any
orthodoxy. It requires us to refuse both ‘a speculative attitude and
determinism’ (Filippini 2012, p. 647) and stimulate the collective
efforts of not just a few but all of us.
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